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INTRODUCTION
With the general increase in exchange rate flexibility, the
analysis of the determination of exchange rates has become a
of research.

major area

AA important aspect of the modelling of this process is

the degree of capital mobility, with the polar assumption of perfect.
mobility being most widely adopted.

This assumption, which is justified

in terms of the observed mobility among the major currencies of the world,
is usually specified in terms of uncovered interest parity, meaning that
speculatiori brings ~he forward exchange rate in line with expectations of
the future spot rate;

see e.g. Argy and Porter (1972), Bi~son (1978).

Furthermore, the recent literature on rational expectations and exchange rate
dynamics, in particular, has been built on this assumption;

see e.g.

Dornbusch (1976), Gray and Turnovsky (1979), Wilson (1979), Turnovsky and
Kingston (1977), Flood (1979).
However, as several authors have shown, even if domestic and foreign
bonds are perfect substitutes on a cover.ed basis, the assumption of uncovered
interest parity follows only if one adds the strong assumption that investors
are risk neutral.

If, more reasonably, investors are taken to be risk averse,

the forward rate is not in general an unbiased predictor of the spot rate
expected to prevail when the forward contract matures.

The bias depends

upon, among other things, asset supplies, the. variability of exchange rates,
and the degree of risk aversion;

see e.g. Solnik (1973j, Grauer, Litzenberger,

and Stehle (1976), Kouri (1976), Adler and Dumas (1977), Roll and Solnik
(1977), Eaton (1978), Frankel (1979), Fama and Farber (1979), Stein (1980).
Furthermore: the theoretical existence of this bias is generally supported
by available empirical evidence;

see Levich (1978, 1979), Hansen and

Hodrick (1980).
The relationship between the forward and expected future spot rates
is crucial.in determining the domestic interest rate, and hence in determining·
the current spot rate, the domestic price level, and domestic income.

It

is therefore important to analyze the determination of the exchange rate under

2.
1
the more general assumption of risk-averse speculative behavior.

The present paper therefore has two objectives.

The first is to

develop a stochastic model of exchange rate determination which allows
Secondly, we shall analyze the

for risk averse speculative behavior.

effects of a variety of disturbances consisting of:

(i)

changes in the

supplies of money and bonds, (ii) forward market intervention, (iii) certain
relevant foreign variables.

In particular, we shall contrast the effects

of transitory and permanent changes in these variables on the domestic economy
and show how an increase in the elasticity of speculation with respect to the
forward premium (reflecting a reduction in the degree of risk aversion) may
influence the effects of the two types of disturbances in opposite ways.
For example, we shall show that an increase in the degree of speculation is
likely to reduce the expansionary effects of a transitory monetary disturbance,
on the one hand, but to increase the expansionary effects of a permanent
monetary disturbance, on the other,
way.

This result can also be looked at another

It means that if in fact investors are risk averse, then the prevalent

procedure of equating the forward rate to the expected future spot rate (and
hence assuming risk neutrality) may understate the effects on income and the
-spot rate of temporary changes in the money supply and necessarily overstates
the corresponding effects of perrrrrnent changes.
We shall also show that less risk-averse speculation increases the
sensitivity of income to announcements of future changes in money supply.

As

speculators become less risk averse, forward intervention policy and changes
in the domestic supply of bonds have less effect on income and exchange
rates

regardless of whether these policies are temporary or permanent. Domestic

income becomes more sensitive to changes in foreign variables, however, as
speculation becomes more risk neutral.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.

Section 2 outlines the

model underlying our analysis, with the solution being provided in Section 3.

Sections 4 through 6 discuss the effects of changes in the money supply,
bond supply

and forward market intervention, and foreign vari2bles,res pectively

Some concluding remarks are provided in Section 7.

2.

TIIE FORWARD EXOIANGE MARKET IN A SIMPLE MACRO M:>DEL
The model we shall consider is kept as simple as possible to enable

us to focus on the main issues without undue complication.

Specifically,

we shall assume tha~ there is a single traded coDDnodity~ whose price in terms
~f foreign currency is given.

Also, we shall assume that the domestic bond

is a perfect substitute for a traded world bond when fully covered against exchang1
risk.

Thus purchasing power parity (PPP) and covered interest parity (CIP)

are assumed to hold:

·P

11:

es + p*

(1)

.it

11:

5
i*t + ef
t - et

(2)

t

t

t

where pt= domestic price of the traded good at time t, expressed in
logarithms,
p* = foreign price of the traded good at time t, expressed in
t

logarithms,
s
et=
current spot exchange rate (measured•in units of domestic

currency per unit of foreign currency), expressed in logarithms,
f

et= forward exchange rate at time t for delivery at time t+l (measured
in terms of units of domestic currency per unit of foreign
currency), expressed in logarithms,
it

ii

11:

domestic nominal interest rate at time t,

11:

foreign nominal interest rate at time t.

The domestic economy is ass~ed to be small so that p;, it are exogenous;
foreign bonds and goods are supplied perfectly elastically at the world
int~rest rate it and foreign price level

Pt•

respectively.

Domestic money market equilibrium is described by the relationship
(3)

where mt= domestic nominal money supply, expressed in logarithms,

Yt = domestic real output at time t, expressed in logarithms.

4.

This specif icatio n is of the usual form.

In partic u~ar, we make the

reside nts,
conve ntiona l assumption that all domestic money is held by domestic
who in turn hold no foreig n money.
The specif icatio n of the forward marke t requir es somewhat more

Privat e partic ipatio n in the forward market may take place for
2
The net supply of foreig n exchange
two reason s, specu lation or arbitr age.
gs of
forward for arbitr age purposes in real terms equals the net real holdin
Forward market
foreig n bonds by the domestic~ privat e secto r.

discus sion.

equili brium requir es that this quant ity

equal the net speau.Zative demand

n exchange
for foreig n exchange forward plus net government purch ases of foreig
brium at
forward both in real terms, The condi tion for forward market equili
time tis theref ore
(4)

Here Et1 Pt and

Pt denote the

exchange rate, the domestic price level

and the foreig n price level, all measured in -natur al units.

o: is the nominal

tic
stock of foreig n bonds (denominated in foreig n curren cy) held by domes
forwa rd
reside nts; St is the real specu lative demand for foreig n exchange
forwa rd.
and Gt is net nominal holdin gs by the government of foreig n exchange
tion
(I'he first part of (4) follows from the purch asing power parity condi
pt

C

EtPi).

Following the theor etical litera ture, we assume that the real supply
of
of foreig n exchange for specu lation is a functi on of the expec ted rate
this
return on the forward purcha se of foreig n curren cy. We approximate
relati onshi p by the expres sion 3
(S)

s
time
where et+l,t denote sthe expec tation of the spot for time t+l, as of

5.

t.

The parameter y

is a decreasing function of the degree of relative

As the degree of relative risk ave~sion tends to zero, so

risk aversion.

that risk neutrality is approached,

y ~~implying e:+l,t = e{;

i.e., the

forward rate becomes an unbiased predictor of the spot rate.
Since, by asswnption, covered foreign bonds are perfect substitutes
for domestic bonds, the real demand for foreign bonds is simply the real

de~and for aZZ bonds, Dt, less the real supply of domestic bonds Bt/~t'
where Bt is the nominal stock of domestic bonds denominated in domestic

currency;

i . e. ,
(6)

The total real demand for bonds Dt is specified by the relationship
(7)

While it is reasonable to assume that Dt is an incre~sing function of the
domestic interest rate, the response of Dt to income is much more
indeterminat~ and therefore we place no sign. restriction on w1 • The presence
of the term Bt/Pt in (6) causes the demand for foreign bonds to remain non
linear.

Denoting in Bt by bt a linear approximation to D:/P~ is given by~
(8)

·I\,
w3 = (Bt/Pt), the average stock of domestic bonds divided by the
average price level and w4 ~ w [1 - tnw3]. We shall normalize units so that
3
1nw3 ~ 1 and w = O, in which case substituting (7) into (8) we obtain
4

where

(8')
Likewise, the real government intervention Gt/Pt is also non-linear
and by a similar process a linear approximation is given by 5
G /P*
t t

where

C

).

(t!. _. p*)
~

(9)

t

,;
I\,
). = (Gt/r;), the average real stock of forward exchange held by the

government, and g+

= tn

G+. Units are chosen so that tn

~ =

1.

6.

Substituting equations (5), (8'), (9) into (4), we obtain the following
condition for forward market equilibrium:
(10)

Finally, we assume that deviations in output from its natural level

-

y are determined by the 1D1anticipated component of the domestic price level.

That is,

(11)

where we nonnalize 1D1its by setting

y=

O, and Pt,t-l denotes the expectation

Qf the price level for time t formed at time t-1.

Such a specification follows

from the contract theory of wage determination of Gray (1976), Fischer (1977)
and Phelps and Taylor (1977).
This completes the specification of the model.

Together, equations

(1), (2), (3), (9) and (10) determine the equilibrium values of the five

endogenous

variables

Pe it, e;,

e:

and yt in terms of the expectations

e:+l,t' Pt,t-l and the exogenous variables

the structural parameters of the system.

ii, Pi, mt, bt, gt, as well as

The only thing that remains before

solving the model is the description of expectations, which we take to
be formed rationally;

i.e. price and exchange rate expectations are optimally

. generated forecasts based on a solution of the model itself using all available
information.
3.

DETERMINATION OF SOLtrrION
Substituting equations (1), (2) and (11) into equations (3) and (10)

we obtain two equations, one a condition for money market equilibrium, the
other a condition for forward market equilibrium.

Together these equations

determine the spot and forward rates of exchange.

In matrix form, the two

equilibrium equations are

•

(12)

7.

Given current expectations about the future and past expectations

about the present, the first line of (12) determines a relationship between
e: and e! that equilibrates the money market and which we label the MM
It appears in Figure 1 and has the slope (1 + a 1e + a 2)/a 2 > 1.
that
The second line of (12) determines a relationship between e: and
curve.

e:

equilibrates the forward exchange niarket and which we label the FF curve.
It has slope (w2 - w1e - w3)/(w2 + y) which can be of either sign. We shall
assume, however, that it is less ·steep than the MM curve. This will certainly
be so if the income elasticity of the demand for bonds, w1 , is not strongly

...

negative .
The ambiguity in the slope of the FF curve arises for the following
reason:

Im increase in e: causes pt to rise, reducing the real supply of

: domestic bonds.

This raises the demand for foreign bonds and hence the

supply of foreign exchange forward.

To generate an offsetting speculative demand

for foreign exchange forward requires a lower value of e:.
in e; also Z01~ers it and hence the der,nnd for bonds.

However, an increase

This has the opposite

The first effect dominates where domestic bonds are a large

effect on c:.

share of total bond holdings and th~ demand for bonds is relatively interest
w2). Conversely, the second effect dominates when w2 > w3 •
For the case in which speculators are risk netural (y + m) the

inelastic (w 3

>

The forward rate is determined solely in the
s
f
forward market by speculative behavior, which ensures that et= et+l,t·

FF curve becomes horizontal.

When the demand for money is interest inelastic, a 2 = 0, and the MM curve
becomes vertical. The spot rate is determined solely by money market

I

equilibr ium. Otherwi se, equilibr ium values of the two rates are determin ed
simultan eously in the two markets .
s

In drawing the MM and FF curves, the expecta tions et+l,t' Pt,t-l
We now endogenize these variabl es by solving for

have been taken as given.

the rationa l expecta tions equilibr ium of the mod~l.
To do so, we first solve (12) (recalli ng (1), (11)) to obtain
s
s
s
et = ut + 't+l,t -

where

pfi.

.. 1
Yt

(13)

u: - [(w2+y)mt + a 2w3bt + a 2Agt - [w2+y+a 2 (w3+A)]pt + a 2yi;]ti.-l

A= (w 2+y) + a 2 (y+w 3)
♦

=a 2yti. -1

< 1

Now take expecta tions from some arbitrar y initial period O < t.
~ropert y of rationa l expecta tions that &(e:+l, tln) =·e:+l, o'

Using the

where '20

denotes informa tion availab le at time O, and taking conditio nal expecta tions

of (11) to . showyt, '[ = O,

T

s

e

t,o

< t, we obtain

= ust,o

(14)

+ "'s

,,et+l,o ·

To solve (14) we shall adopt the method of undeterm ined coeffic ients,
hypothe sizing a solution of the form
m

s
e

t,o

=

I. .

1=0

s

(15)

+ k
.
µ.u
t
1 t+1,o

Substitu tin-g (15) into (14), we obtain

·[ is:oI 1 t+1,o
µ. tis .

+

k ) = us· O +

t,

t

4> [

r

µ

us

i=l i-1 t+i,o

+ k

t+l

)

.(16)

and equating coeffic ients, we find
(17a)
(17b)
µ

0

•

1:

(17c)

9.

The general solution to (14) is thus of the form
{18)

where k

0

is an arbitrary constant.

s

Since~< 1, to ensure that e t,o

6
remains bounded as t ~ m, we impose the restriction that k0 = 0.

Thus from (18) it follows that
CD

S

et+l,t =

t

.L
1=0

•

1 S

~ ut+i+l t
'

s
while the solution for the actual spot rate, et, is obtained by substituting

(19) into (13), recalling that u:,t = u:.

Thus we obtain
(20)

To solve for current output yt, we substitute the purchasing power
relationship (1) into the supply function (11),

Usi~g (19) at time t-1,

together with (20), we may write the solution for yt in the form
(21)

.From (21) we observe that yt depends upon the unanticipated components of
changes in the foreign price level (p: - P~,t-l) and the composite disturbance
s

s

term (ut - ut,t-l).

In addition, it depends upon an infinite discounted

s
s
t ), which measure the extent to which forecasts
t - ut.
- sum of terms (ut.
+1, - 1
+1,
s
of ut+i are updated between periods t-1 and t, as information at time t

becomes available.
f
. An expression for et can be obtained by solving (12) and substituting

(19), yielding
(22)

.. v.

5
• t' the current values of income and the spot and
Through the terms et +1..,

forward exchange rates depend upon the entire time profile of expectation s
of all future money supplies, bond supplies, government position in the

Equations (20), (21).,

forward market, and relevant foreign disturbance s.

Reduced form expressions

(22) form the basis for our subsequent analysis.

e:

may be obtained by substitutin g the solution for y~, (21).,
.
into (20), (22), but it is not necessary to report these explicitly. In
fore! and

subsequent sections below we consider the effects of three types of disturbance s
on the economy:
(i)

various forms of domestic monetary expansion;

(ii)

various forms of bond market or forward market interventio n
by the domestic monetary authorities ;

(iii)

internation al disturbance s, taking the ~orm of changes
in the foreign price level and foreign interest rate.

These three topics are addressed in Sections 4-6 respectivel y.
4.

OOMESTIC MONETARY EXPANS ION

From the solution (20) - (22) the effects of an infinite range of
monetary disturbance s can in principle be analyzed.
most usefully be distinguish ed in terms of:
- are anticipated or unanticipat ed;

These disturbance s can

(a) the extent to which they

(b) their expected permanence or transcience ;

(c} whether they occur immediately or are announced.

Any specific monetary

disturbance can be parameteriz ed quite explicitly by imposing the appropriate
changes.on the relevant terms appearing in the expressions u:+i.,t' u:+i,t"
Obviously we can discuss just a limited number of disturbance s., although
others can be

.

considered along similar lines.

In all cases, the monetary

disturbance will take the form of an increase in the money supply dmt, which
is effected by a transfer.
treated in a similar way;

An open market operation can, however, be readily
see footnote 8 below,

11.
· 4.1

An Unanticip ated, Temoorary Increase in the 1-!oney Supply

The initial disturban ce in the money supply we shall consider is
(i) \Dlanticip ated as of period t-1, and (ii) expected

one which is:

to last only during period t.
shock.

It is therefore a purely random one-perio d

Accordingly, du:+i,t = du:+i,t-l =. 0,

i

IO.

This disturban ce can be treated quite convenie ntly by means of
s
remains
ut.
+1, t
fixed, the spot rate·expe cted to prevail in period t+l and given by the

the MM and FF curves given in Figure 1.

•
S1nce

expressio n (19) is also l.Dlaffected by the changes being considere d;
s
det+l,t = O.

that is,

Thus the assumption of constant expectati ons incorpora ted in

the MM and FF curves is consisten t with rational expectati ons when disturban ces
in the money supply are perceived as temporary.
The effect of a random transfer in the money supply dm is to shift
the MM curve rightward .

At any given forward rate, a higher spot rate is

required to restore money market equilibriu m.
by the change.

The FF C1ll'Ve is unaffecte d

Since, by assumption, the MM curve is steeper than the FF

curve, the spot rate rises, as does the forward rate if FF is upward sloping.
In terms of Figure 1, the equilibriu m moves from A to B, say.

As

long as

the slope of the FF curve is less than one (which will be the case \Dlless
~l is highly negative ),
rate falls.

e:

rises by more thane! and the domestic interest

Thus a temporary increase in the money supply is reflected

110re in the current spot rate than it is in the forward rate.

Given that

we would expect the spot rate to be more sensitive to current random
disturban ces, while forward rates will tend to reflect more permanent changes,
this result makes good intuitive sense.

'i'
l

The effect of an increase in~ on income yt is given by

·I

(23)

where the subscript tr refers to "transito ry".

Thus an \Dlanticip ated increase

in the money supply that is not expected to persist has an expansion ary
effect.

Differen tiating (23) with respect toy reveals that an increase in

12.

the elasticity of speculation has an ambiguous effect on the size of the
income response.

If the FF curve slopes up more elastic speculation diminishes

the effect, and conversely.

The same comments apply to the effects of increased

speculation on the spot rate.

An increase in y ties the forward rate more closely to the expected
future spot rate:

whatever its slope, the FF curve becomes more hori:ontal.

When the FF curve slopes up an increase in the money supply raises the forward
rate and conversely.

of the response.

Increased speculation reduces the absolute magnitude

If the forward rate rises as a result of the monetary

expansion, increased speculation reduces the extent of this rise.

The fall

in the forward premium and hence in the domestic interest rate (via the
·1

I

interest rate parity condition (2)) is increased, thereby increasing the

i

Conversely, if the foNard rate faZZs as a

expansionary effect on income.

I'

result of the monetary expansion then more speculation reduces the extent
of this fall.

I

The fall in the interest rate is reduced, as is the expansionary

effect on income.
4.2

The Effects of Changes in Expectations

Any change. in the money supply that is expected to be permanent also
has effects on expectations.
· effects of an increase in

In order to consider these we analyze the

e:+ l,

t:

on e; and e~.

An increase in e!+l,t shifts the FF curve upward by _an amount y/(w +y),
2
leaving the ~II curve tmchanged, thereby shifting the equilibrium from A to C

in Figure 1.

Both the spot and forward rates rise, the forward rate by

proportionately more.

As

the elasticity of speculation increases, so does

the response of both rates to changes in expectations, with the increased
responsiveness of the spot rate increasing that of income ..
4-.3

The Effects of an Unanticipated, Per11U1nent Change
.
We now consider the effects of a monetary expansion that initially

is unanticipated, but having occurred is expected to be permanent.

This

form of monetary disturbance has recently been discussed extensively in the
literature, and has shown to give rise to the possibility of "overshooting"
of the spot exchange rate to a monet~ry disturbance;
Turnovsky (1981).

see Dornbusch (1976),

,r'·.
..
J

I:

,I.,).

Any monetary expansion that is expected to be permanent influences
the system in two ways.

in Section 4.1 and second,

in Section 4.2.

·A to D.
(y =

through the channels discussed

It operates first
through

its

effects on expectations noted

These changes are illustrated in Fig.· 1 as a change from

In the extreme case in which speculators are infinitely risk averse

0), expectations have no effect on the present and it is therefore

irrelevant whether a particular change is perceived as permanent or temporary.
Otherwise, both channels must be considered.
The impact effect of an unanticipated change in the money supply
that ex post is expected to be permanent is given by
(24)

where the subscript p refeYls

to ''permanent".

Comparing (24) with (23),

we see that the response of income is larger when the change in the money
s~pply is perceived as being permanent.

In this case e:+l,t becomes greater,

: thereby reinforcing the expansionary effect resu~ting from the increased
money supply.
The effects on the spot and forward rates are given by
(25a)

(25b)

From (25a) it is seen that a 1% increase in the money supply leads to

a less than 1% devaluation of the spot rate.

Provided that the FF curve

is upward sloping the monetary expansion will increase the forward rate,
although again less than p~oportionately.

The ratio of the effects of a

permanent increase in the money supply upon the forward and spot rates is
given by the.expression

w - ew - w + (l+p8/6)y
3
2
1
(1)2 + y

(26)

while the corresponding ratio with respect to temporary disturbances is
w2 - Owl - w3

(27)

(1)2 + y

C~mparing these two ratios we may infer that unless w1 is very negative, an
increase in the money supply will have a relatively greater effect on the
forward rate when it is expected to be permanent than when it is expected
to be transitory.

This result makes perfectly good intuitive sense for the

reasons noted in Section 4.1.
An increase in the elasticity of speculation inaPeases the extent
to which income and the two exchange rates respond to a permanent increase

This result contrasts with the 8JI!oiguous effects of

in the money supply.

increasingly elastic speculation ~n the response to a temporary increase,
Since elastic speculation ties the current spot rate and income more closely
.t~ the future, it may dampen the effects of temporary changes, but it amplifies

the effects of permanent ones.

As

the elasticity_ of speculation tends to

infinity, we obtain

[de;]
dmt p

l

de:1

l+a 2

= l+a e+a

1

<

(28a)

1

2

= 1

(28b)

dmt]p

Thus. far we have considered only the impaat effects of a permanent
change in the money supply.

e:, e:

These short-r1D1 responses in the exchange rates

include an income effect, which operates through the last term in

equations (20), (22).
of zero.

For~> t, income reverts to its steady state level

The permanent changes in the spot and forward rates are respectively,
't >

t

(29a)

15.

w2- 111 3+y
w2+y+a2w3

T

(29b)

> t

When w > 0 and a

> 0 the permanent change in the spot rate is
2
less than the permanent change in the money supply while the permanent
3

change in the forward rate is even lower.

The reason is that the initial

increase in the price level reduces the real supply of bonds, increasing
the demand for foreign bonds, and lowering c!.

The consequent decline in

the domestic interest rate raises the demand for money, so that a proportional
change in the price level is not required.

Comparing (29a) and (25a) we see that the steady state response of
the spot exchange rate to an unanticipated permanent increase in the money
supply exceeds its response on impact.
shoots" its long-run response.

That is, the exchange rate "under

While this result is in contrast the over

shooting obtained by Dornbusch, the difference is due to differences in
assumptions and accords with similar results in the literature.
factors in our model are:

(i) that the domestic price level is not only

flexible, but also ~ied to the world price via PPP;

of income.

The critical

(ii) the endogeneity

As a consequence, any nominal expansion in the money supply is

·accomodated partly by income changes and partly by price changes, thereby
requiring less adjustment in the exchange rate. 7
4.4

Announcement Effects
Thus far we have considered temporary and permanent increases in

the money supply that were unanticipated as of the period before which they
actually occurred.

If, instead, we consider changes in period t that are

announced in period t-k, our analysis is subject to several modifications.
First, there are real effects only during period t-k, when the
announcement is made.· In all subsequent periods prices are correctly
anticipated.

The effects of one-period changes in period t, the time the

policy is put into effect, one: and e; can be obtained as before, only

with the income effects removed.

Algebraically, these results may be

obtained by replacjng e with O in th: analysis in Section 4.1.

No qualitative

. .,..

differences in the responses of
are anticipated.

e: and ·e! arise when temporary changes

Wh;n permanent changes are anticipated, e: and e!

assume their new steady-state·va lues, as income effects are
now absent.
Exchange rates from periods t-k until tare ~ffected solely by
the effect of the announcement on expectations.
s

f

s

.

Having computed the

effec! on et, the effects on et-land et-l may be derived via the analysis
in Section 4.2, again ,dth the income effects suppressed (unless k = 1).
k > i > 1 may be solved similarly via backward iteration.
The effects on ets.
-l.
In period t-k, the announcement period, the income effect is no longer
suppressed.
The effect of the announcement monetary increase on income during
the announce~ent period, yt-l' is given by the expression
=

Thus the effect on yt-k·is qualitatively independent of the lag, but
'declines quantitatively as the lag becomes longer. and speculation and
money demand becomes less elastic.

In particular, if the demand for money

is interest inelastic or speculation inelastic, changes announced in advance
have no effects on real activity at any stage.

Thus less risk-averse speculation

raises the sensitivity of income to preannoun~ed monetary changes.
S.

FORWARD MARKET INTERVENTION AND CHANGES IN DOMESTIC BOND SUPPLY
The effects of forward market intervention by the domestic government

and changes ~n the supply of domestic bonds can be described by considering
vario~s chan_ges in gt and bt:

Note that. gt and bt appear in (12) additively.

Thus changes in these policy variables have parallel effects.

An increase

in bt reduces the demand for foreign bonds and hence the supply of foreign
exchange forward for abritrage.

The private speculative demand for foreign

exchange forward required to equilibrate the forward market is thereby
reduced.

A government purchase of foreign exchange forward does the same

thing directly.

In either case a higher value of e! is compatible with
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forward market equilib rium.

As with a monetary distur bance , these two

changes can take variou s forms (antic ipated versus unanti cipate
d, temporary
versus perma nent,e tc.) and can be analyzed in a simila r fashio
n to Sectio n 4.
For this reason our comments can be brief.
Consid er the effect s of an unanti cipate d, one-pe riod increa se
in
the supply of domestic bonds or, equiva icntly , a one-tim e centra
l bank
purcha se of foreig n exchange in the forward marke t. Either
will bid up

e~, given any value of e::

the FF curve in Figure l shifts up.

forward rates will theref ore rise,

Both spot and

Since the slope of the ~~f curve exceed

unity, the forward rate rises by more than the spot rate, so
that the domes tic
intere st rate rises. Since e! rises, so does the domestic price
level,
and with it domestic output . Thus these effect s are qualit ativel
y simila r to
those of a temporary monetary expans ion, except that direct
interv ention in
the forward market has a relati vely greate r effect on the forwar
d rate.
Consequently expansion is accompanied by an increa se rather
thm a decrea se
in the intere st rate.
the elasti city of specul ation increa ses, the forward rate become
s
increa singly tied !O the expect ed future rate and th~ upward
shift in the
FF curve dimini shes, reduci ng the overal l impact of.the interv
ention on
As

. the endogenous variab les

e:,

e~, and. yt.

In the limit, as specul ation

becomes perfec tly elasti c, all these effect s vanish .
Turning now to an unannounced increa se in bt that

e~ post is

expect ed to be permanent .or,eq uivale ntlr, a centra l bank purcha
se of foreig n
exchange forward that is expect ed to be mainta ined each period
, we may
show that, as with a temporary change in gt or bt, the forwar
d rate respon ds
110re than the spot rate. This is true both on impact and in
steady state,
Thus an increa se in gt or bt will raise the domestic intere st
rate perma ~ently ,
unless the elasti city ·y is infini te, in which case all effect
s tend to
7
zero,
Finall y, we note that

steady state values of e 5 , ef, and pare

h01D0geneous of degree one in band m, while i and y are homoge
neous of
degree zero. Hence permanent propo rtiona l increa ses in band
m have no
effect on the covered intere st differ ential , ~c.

IL-
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6.

INTERNATIONAL DISTURBANCES
The effects of disturbance s in the two foreign variables p*

i* can be analyzed similarly.

and

In general, these two variables will move

simultaneou sly as they respond to common influences abroad.

For example,

an increase in demand abroad will cause both p* and i* to rise, while a
monetary expansion abroad will cause i* to fall but p* to rise.

For

simplicity, we shall focus on the two disturbance s separately, recognizing
that any real world disturbance will be some composite of the two effects.
6.1

Foreign Price Level Disturbance
An unanticipat ed temporary increase in p~ will shift the

MM curve

to the left while the FF curve falls vertically, causing both e: and
to fall.

As

e:

speculation b.ecomes more elastic the size of the shift in the

FF cu":'Ve diminishes and in the limit,as y tends to infinity, the FF curve
remains fixed.

Thus as y

the effect of a foreign price increase

rises

on the exchange rate diminishes.
The effect of the foreign price disturbance on domestic income is

dy] .
[dpi tr=
Provided that the

average of

(30)

level

interventio n in the forward market

is less than the elasticity of speculation

·cA

< y),

an increase in the

foreign price level generates a less than proportiona l fall in the spot
rate so that the domestic price level rises, causing income to rise as well.

The existence of a positive government position in the forward market (A> 0)
causes e; and e! to fall further in response to an increase in pt,providin g
an offsetting contraction ary effect.

Indeed, if the net government po~ition

Only when a 2 = 0 or
y·•. l is the response of the exchange rate proportion al, so that income is
is sufficientl y large, income may actually fall.

lDlaffccted.

As

speculation becomes more elastic, exchange rates become more

lUlder the influence of future expectation s and respond less to current
forei~,n price changes.

The effect of a change in the foreign price level is
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conseque ntly more fully reflected in the domestic price level, so that
the response of income is increased .
In the absence of a government net position in the forward exchange
market, the effect of an unanticip ated permanent cha~ge in p; on yt is zero.
The spot rate appreciat es by the amount of the foreign price increase.
Thus there is no effect on the domestic price level.
also changes by the same amount.

The forward rate

Therefore , even on impact, changes in

the foreign price level ~hat are perceived as permanent have no real
effects.

See Harris and Purvis (1979) for a similar result.

With~> 0,

however, an tmanticip ated pennanent increase in p; generates a more than
proportio nal appreciat ion of the spot rate, causing domestic income to fall.
6.2

Foreign Interest Rate Disturban ce
An \D'lanticipated one-perio d increase in i; lea<ls to downward shifts

The fall in the former exceeds that of the

in both the MM and FF curves.

l~tter so that the spot rate rises, while the response of the forward rate
is ambiguous. 'Because of the rise in the spot rate, the domestic price
level and output also rise.

As

speculati on becomes more elastic the shift

of the FF curve declines in absolute magnitude and the increases in the
spot rate and income become greater.
The effect of an 1.Dlanticipated change in the foreign interest rate
that is perceived as being permanent on income is
{31)

with an_ increase in the elasticit y of speculati on increasin g the magnitude

o~ this impact.

It is interesti ng to note that, in steady state, the change

in the domestic interest rate resulting from a permanent change in the
foreign rate is

•

y

{32)
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In general a pennanent rise in the foreign interest rate leads to a less
than proportional rise in the· domestic interest rate.

If speculation is

perfectly inelastic there is no effect, while as speculation becomes
perfectly elastic, the effect tends toward exact proportionality.
7.

CONCLUSONS
This paper has developed a macroeconomic model in which domestic

and foreign bonds are perfect substitutes on a covered basis, but in
which.speculators are assUI!led to be risk averse.

Under such conditions,

previous portfolio investment models have shown a risk premium on forward
exchange is likely to be established.

We have analyzed the effects of

various transitory and permanent disturbances on the economy and shown
how the existence of the risk premium has important implications for macro
economic behavior.
Perhaps of greatest interest is the proposit~on that an increase
in the degree of speculation, reflecting a reduction in the degree of risk
· aversion, is likely to reduce the expansionary effects of a transitory
increase in the money supply,on the one hand, while increasing the expansionary
effects of a permanent increase, on the other.

From this it follows that the

assumption of perfectly elastic speculation (under which the risk premium
is eliminated) is likely to overstate the difference between permanent and
temporary changes.

This assumptioL also tends to exaggcratethe announcement

effects of changes to occur in the future.
Because our model explicitly incorporates a forward market, it suggests
some-interesting implications as to how spot and forward rates reveal
information about expectations.

Typically, changes that are perceived as

being_ permanent are reflected relatively more in the forward rate, while the
spot rate responds more to changes

that are seen as being only temporary.

Our analysis has focused· primarily on how the economy responds to
temporary and permanent changes in the money and bond supplies and in the
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central bank's forward market position.

A natural extension of

this is the design of money supply and forward market intervention
rules

that stabilize the domestic economy in the face of stochastic

disturbances.

This issue is_ taken up elsewhere. 9
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FOOTNOTES

1.

2.

Two other macroeconomic models which incorporate a more general specification
of speculation in the determination of forward market equilibrium are by
Eaton (1978) and Harris and Purvis (1979). Both models assume full employment
so that the income effects of various disturbances cannot be analyzed. Both
papers also focus on situations in which current information is not fully
available. and consider the information revealed by spot and forward exchange
rates.
We find it analytically convenient to separate forward market participation

into pure speculation and pure arbitrage. We implicitly treat the acquisi~ion
of an amount x of uncovered foreign bonds as combining a cove;,ed investment
of x in foreign bonds and a specuZati1,e purch.ase of foreign currency fon:ard
in amount x. In a portfolio modei of foreign investment we identify a third
motive for participating in the forward market as hedging against domestic
inflation. Forward positions for hedging purposes depend upon the relative
variability of the domestic and foreign price levels and do not respond to
·the variables we are concerned with here. We may thus treat the forward
position due to hedging as a constant absorbed in St; see Eaton and
Turnovsky (1980).
3.

as well as other parameters of the macro model are functions of the
variances o 2 etc. Elsewhere (Eaton and Turnovsky (1980)) we have shown
how these P variances can be generated by underlying exogenous stochastic
elements of the economy,

4.

The approximation in (8) is obtained as follows

y

.
pt -P ]
Bt -B
p8

Now

8t -B.
8
p

Similarly

-

-P

"'P
t
t
--=-=
p

so that

-

Bt

pt~

-tnP

Ca>

3 [1 + (bt - .tn 8) - (pt - .tn P))

• w3 [1 - .tn Ca> 3]

+

w3 (bt - pt).

S.

The a~gwnent follows tha~ in footnote 4, with Gt/Pt in place of Bt/Pt.

6.

One rationale for this procedure is obtained by imposing a transversality
condition on a corresponding infinite .horizon optimization problem.

7.

E~sewhere
(Eaton and Turnovsky (1981)) we consider the implication of risk averse
speculation for exchange rate dynamics in a model that incorporates short-run
price inflexilibity. See also Driskill (1980) and Driskill and Mccafferty
See Turnovsky (1981) for further discussion of this issue.

(1980).

8.

A monetary expansion taking the form of an open market operation is
described by dM +dB= 0, which in terms of logarithms ·is dm + (B/M)db = 0.
In effect this is a combination of the policies discussed in Sections 4 and
5 and the various cases can be considered as an extension of theseresults.
It is worth noting that in the absence of wealth effects (w_ = 0) an open
market operation is equivalent to the monetary expansion ~discussed in
the text.

9. ·

See Eaton and Turnovsky (1980).
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